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1. AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
IN ITALY 
 
In Italy, collective bargaining represents the most important mechanism for regulating and 
defining terms and conditions of employment. The bargaining system is based on a two-tier 
structure: national collective agreements (NCAs hereinafter) are negotiated at the sectoral 
level by national trade unions and employers’ associations and are applied to all employees 
of the specific economic sector. At this sectorial level, the main contractual arrangements 
of the employment relations are established as, for instance, wage levels, working 
conditions, job classifications, working time and access to social security protections (such 
as allowances covering maternity, sickness, injuries). NCAs are legally binding only upon 
employers and employees belonging to the organisations that have signed them, or that 
choose to apply them even though they are not a member of the signatory employers’ 
association. However, NCAs cannot be extended to the whole sector by legislation, but a de 
facto extension is set out by labour courts in case of a dispute. 
At the decentralised level, second-level integrative agreements are negotiated, 
generally at the company level (but also at territorial level, regional or provincial level) by 
the employers and the local branch of the trade unions that have signed the NCA applied in 
the plant. Indeed, only signatory unions are allowed to take part in second-level bargaining. 
At this level, company-specific arrangements delegated by NCAs are defined, like 
productivity standards, performance-related pay, schemes for incentive remuneration and 
special kinds of allowances and indemnities. As anticipated, decentralised second-level 
bargaining takes mainly place at the company/workplace level, in the private 
manufacturing and service sectors as well as in the public administration. However, in 
peculiar economic sectors, decentralised agreements are negotiated at the territorial level. 
In the construction sector, tourism and agriculture, second-level bargaining takes place at 
the provincial level; in the artisanal sector, instead, at the regional level. 
In terms of duration and timing of collective bargaining, the NCAs are generally 
renewed every third year, while wage levels are adjusted to the inflation rate every year. 
Decentralised second-level agreements have variable duration, but renewals tend to follow 
the renewal of the NCAs of the sector of belonging. Agreements concerning productivity 
standards and productivity bonuses, however, used to be renegotiated every year, to update 
the variable objectives. 
In Italy, the largest and most representative trade unions are affiliated to the three 
main union confederations: the CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labour), the CISL 














2. METHODOLOGY  
 
The actors’ coordination in the collective bargaining in both the pharmaceutical and large 
retail sector was investigated through a two steps process. The first phase was based on a 
qualitative analysis of the relationships among the relevant actors and on the mechanisms 
through which they coordinate in the definition and negotiations of the NCAs. A preliminary 
analysis of the documentary sources and of the relevant literature in the two sectors was 
followed by exploratory semi-structured interviews with the core actors identified in the 
processes of collective bargaining. A common grid was used to carry out the interviews, 
focusing on the following topics: presentation of the sector, mechanisms to set wages in 
the sector, intra-organisational coordination, inter-organisational coordination, influence on 
other sectors. The interviews have been recorded, fully transcribed and content analysed. 
More specifically, in the pharmaceutical sector 4 semi-structured interviews with 
key informant (3 trade unionists and 1 employer) have been conducted, complemented by 
an observatory participation to an internal meeting of the bipartite body FONCHIM created 
to provide an integrative pension fund to the workers in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector. In the retail sector, 7 semi-structured interviews have been realized (2 trade 
unionists and 5 employers) between October and December 2018, in Florence, Rome, and 
Milan.  
This first qualitative phase enabled also to point out the complete network of actors 
involved in the collective bargaining in each sector: 16 actors in the pharmaceutical sector 
and 15 the retail one. The second phase of the analysis based on the Social Network 
Analysis targeted these networks. An on-line questionnaire was drafted and adapted to the 
Italian context, as well as further adjusted to the specificities of each sector analysed. The 
questionnaire was circulated on-line via the platform SurveyMonkey: the survey response 
rate amounted to 63% in the pharmaceutical sector (10 respondents out of 16) and to the 
80% in the retail sector (12 respondents out of 15). Nevertheless, not all the questionnaire 
collected were fully filled. 
In detail, in the pharmaceutical sector a strong resistance in answering to the 
questionnaire was encountered, in particular to the sections regarding the power 
relationships among actors and the influence of each actor in the network. It turned to 
represent a too sensitive topic to be explored in such a direct way and survey participants 
refused to answer. Furthermore, the SNA was criticised as methodology to study 
relationships which are defined as too complex to be simplified through rates and numbers. 
All in all, the sector turned not to be suitable for the application of the methodology.  
In the retail sector, more or less the same issues have been faced during the two 
above-mentioned phases. Moreover, it should be noticed that since December 2018 – 
which means during the fieldwork – three national collective agreements regulated the 
employment conditions – for medium and large-scale retailers, for small retailers and for 
cooperative retail respectively. Only recently, the employer association who represents the 
large and modern retail industry signed the fourth national collective agreement who sets 
the employment conditions for the GDO. Therefore, from January 2019, four national 
collective agreements regulate the employment conditions and wage settings. This change 
occurred during the fieldwork not only has altered all the historical equilibriums of the 
industrial relations in the retail sector, but also the relationships among social partners 







3. SECTORAL ANALYSIS  
 
3.1. Pharmaceutical sector 
 
3.1.1.  Socio-economic situation 
 
The pharmaceutical sector represents a global business per excellence, being primarily 
export-oriented and dominated by a limited number of multinational companies, the Big 
Pharma, based mainly in the US and in Europe. In terms of international ranking, the Italian 
pharmaceutical industry represents the 6th main exporter among the member state with a 
market share accounting for 4.9% in 2017, following Germany (15.35%) and Switzerland 
(13.45%) as leading countries, then Ireland (7.22%), UK (5.99%) and France (5.82%), 
displaying current market share similar to the Italian one. Interestingly, the export market 
share in Italy has remained almost unchanged in the aftermath of the economic crisis, 
displaying values comparable to the decade preceding the crisis (OECD 2017). 
One fourth of the pharmaceutical establishments located in Italy are owned by 
foreign investors, amounting to 108 in 2014. This data is particularly significant if 
considered that their turnout correspond to the 62% of the total turnout in the Italian 
pharmaceutical industry; they employ the 53% of the workforce in the sector, and that they 
contribute to the 48% of the total expenditure in research and development (Istat – 
Rilevazione sulle attività delle imprese a controllo estero residenti in Italia). Also, the 
presence of the Italian pharmaceutical industry abroad is remarkable: 189 companies 
controlled by Italian capitals are based abroad, employing 23,000 workers and amounting 
to €5,747million of turnout (Istat – Rilevazione sulle attività estere delle imprese a controllo 
nazionale).  
In line with the trend observed also in the other European countries, the Italian 
production has increased until the 2008 financial crisis when, after a short decline, it 
remains permanently stable since 2010. Moreover, between the 2010 and the 2017, in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, the growth of the pharmaceutical industry turned to be the 
highest among the Italian economic sectors, featured by: an increase in the overall 
production corresponding to the 21% (while the average in the manufacturing corresponds 
to -3%); an increase of 73% in the export (against an average +33%); and a 100% of growth 
devoted to the export (while the domestic sales decreased). All in all, the pharmaceutical 
sector turned to be rather dynamic also in comparative perspective with the other economic 
sector within the national economy, scoring higher than other manufacturing activities in 
terms of index of industrial production in the time-lapse 2012-2016 (Istat – Indagine 
mensile sulla produzione industriale). 
In line with a lively production, also the structural developments of the employment 
present a positive trend. The pharmaceutical sector displays a rather stable trend, 
characterised by a light drop immediately after the economic crisis but an overall stability. 
The sector employs on average about 1.8 million workers in Italy, representing the 0.7% of 
the total employment and the 4.5% of the employment in the manufacturing industry (data: 
oecd.stat). Moreover, the workforce involved in the satellite activities counts further 66,000 
workers (www.farmindustria.it). 
Overall, the pharmaceutical sector is characterised by a highly qualified workforce 





www.farmindustria.it) and a quite fair gender balance compared to other economic sectors. 
The male component amounts to about the 62%, while the female components overall 
amounts to 38% of the total workforce, amounting to 52% in the research branch (Eurostat 
Labour Force Survey 2018).  
The distribution of pharmaceutical companies in the Italian territory is characterised 
by a marked concentration in the Northern regions. In terms of number of active enterprises, 
indeed, more than half of the companies is located in the northern regions, and in particular 
in the northern-western part of Italy where the 44.7% of the total active companies is 
situated (204 enterprises out of 456). More in detail, 169 companies are concentrated in 
the Lombardy region. The concentration of companies is rather high also in the centre of 
Italy, were the 26% is located, in particular in Lazio (75 companies) and Tuscany (37 
companies). Lombardy represents the first pharmaceutical region in Europe, with 28,000 
employees in the sector and 18,000 workers involved in the satellite activities. Emilia-
Romagna embodies a pole of excellence in the ancillary activities with its 7,000 workers 
and by directly employing 3,600 employees.  
The Menarini Group (https://www.menarini.it/) is the largest Italian pharmaceutical 
group in the world based in Florence (Tuscany), counting 17,640 employees, distributing its 
products across 136 countries, out of which 70 countries through a direct involvement and 
more than 30 countries through local distributors. With its €3,667 millions of turnover in 
2018, the 75% abroad, the Menarini group in fact has established fruitful international 
collaborations, to improve in particular the R&D potentiality. It is affiliated to Farmindustria. 
The Chiesi Group (https://www.chiesi.com/) is an international group founded in Parma 
(Emilia-Romagna) in 1935, that represents the second largest Italian group in the 
pharmaceutical sector with its 5,624 workers in 2019, a turnover of €1,768,000 million 
and an investment in R&D amounting to €382,000. It is affiliated to both Farmindustria 
and Federchimica. The Bracco Group (https://corporate.bracco.com/it-it) is an Italian 
multinational company, the third largest in the country, operating in the life sciences sector 
and a world leader in diagnostic imaging. Founded in 1927, it counts a consolidated 
turnover of around €1.3 billion, of which 87% on foreign markets, in particular in North 
America (€550 million) and in Europe (€476 million). It employs approximately 3,450 
employees. It is affiliated to both Farmindustria and Federchimica. 
 
3.1.2. Single and multi-employer collective bargaining 
 
On the union side, the main trade unions organising in the pharmaceutical sector are 
affiliated to the three major Italian union confederations CGIL, CISL and UIL and are 
respectively: Filctem-CGIL, Femca-CISL and Uiltec-UIL. Beyond the three confederal unions, 
further autonomous trade unions organise in the sector: the UGL-Chimici, FAILC-CONFAIL 
and FIALC-CISAL. Overall, the collective representation of workers in the sector displays a 
low degree of fragmentation, unlike in other sectors, such as the public sector. Membership 
to the union is voluntary and these sectoral trade unions compete for the recruitment of 
members given that their domain coverage perfectly overlaps. The economic sectors 
organised by the union category is rather wide, encompassing workers not only from the 
chemical and the pharmaceutical sector, but also from textile, clothing and footwear 
industry, and from the energy sector. Although the pharmaceutical industry is not the 
largest category in the national sectoral trade union in terms of membership, it certainly 






The Filctem-CGIL (Federazione Italiana Lavoratori Chimica Tessile Energia 
Manifatture) is the Italian Federation of Workers in the Chemical, Textile, Energy and 
Manufacturing Industries, affiliated to the major union confederation CGIL (Confederazione 
Generale Italiana del Lavoro) the Italian General Confederation of Labour. With an 
historically consolidated unitary tradition, the Filctem-CGIL affiliates more than 216,000 
members in important productive sectors of manufacturing and craft (chemical-
pharmaceutical, textile-clothing and footwear, plastic rubber, glass, tanning and leather, 
ceramic and tile, glasses, industrial laundries, lamps and displays), energy (oil, gas 
transport, mines) and services with high technological relevance (electricity, water, gas). It 
counts 33,000 active members in the chemical-pharmaceutical sector (Eurofound 2014). 
The Femca-Cisl (Federazione Energia Moda Chimica e Affini) is the Union Federation 
in the Energy Fashion Chemical Industries and alike, affiliated to the second Italian union 
confederation CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori), the Italian 
Confederation of Workers’ Unions. Organised by three main categories - chemical, energy 
and fashion – the union organized workers employed in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry, in oil, gas and water companies, in mines, in companies in the textile and clothing 
sectors, in tanning, leather and footwear, in companies that produce or work rubber and 
plastic, ceramics and tiles, glass and lamps and in the companies of related sectors. Femca-
Cisl counts overall 58,000 members, out of which 48,000 active members in the chemical-
pharmaceutical sector (Eurofound 2014). Accordingly, even if the union is the second 
largest in Italy, it represents the major one in terms of membership in the pharmaceutical 
category.  
The Uiltec-UIL (Unione Italiana Lavoratori Tessile, Energia e Chimica) is the Union 
Federation of Workers in the Textile Emergy and Chemical Industry affiliated to the union 
confederation UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro), the Italian Labor Union. It was created in 
2013 from the merger between UILCEM (Italian Union of Energy Chemistry and 
Manufacturing) and UILTA (Italian Union of Textile and Clothing Workers). The Uiltec-UIL 
counts 120,901 members overall, including all the domain of coverage (Eurofound 2014). 
Also, on the employer side, the degree of fragmentation in the representation of 
interests is very low. Two organisations are active in the pharmaceutical sector: 
Farmindustria and Federchimica, both affiliated to the employer confederation 
Confindustria, the main association representing manufacturing and service companies in 
Italy. While Farmindustria affilates almost exclusively companies in the pharmaceutical 
sector, Federchimica primarily target the chemical industries, but encompassing also the 
pharmaceutical companies. Membership to these associations is voluntary. Farmindustria 
(Associazione delle imprese del farmaco), the Association of Enterprises in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector, established in 1978, represents a major sectoral employer 
association in the pharmaceutical industry. It currently counts around 200 affiliated 
companies operating in Italy, with both domestic and foreign capital, for a total of about 
63,500 employees (www.farmindustria.it). Federchimica (Federazione nazionale 
dell’industria chimica) is the Italian Federation of the Chemical Industry, representing 
companies in the chemical sector and service enterprises for the chemical sector. It 
currently affiliates 1,400 companies, almost all in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector, 
with a total of about 90,000 employees in the sector.  
The main level of collective bargaining in the pharmaceutical sector is the sectoral 
level. The coverage is particularly high, estimated to amount to 90-95% (Eurofound 2014). 
The multi-employer bargaining prevails in the sectoral collective negotiations, where the 





Two main national collective agreements (NCA hereinafter) applied in the pharmaceutical 
sector, both signed on the employer side by the two main associations Farmindustria and 
Federchimica, while the union signatory parties vary. The most widespread national 
collective agreement is the contract for the chemical and pharmaceutical sector signed by 
the three major trade unions in the sector Filctem-CGIL, Femca-CISL and Uiltec-UIL, while a 
second one is negotiated by the autonomous trade unions UGL-Chimici, FAILC-CONFAIL and 
FIALC-CISAL. 
The NCA covers over 171,000 workers in the sector: in particular about 109,400 in 
chemical sector and about 62.300 in the pharmaceutical industry. The contract applies to 
2,770 companies affiliated to Federchimica and 174 affiliated to Farmindustria in a wide 
range of economic sectors including: chemical, pharmaceutical, chemical fibres, 
detergents, dielectrics, carbon electrodes, waxes and lights, abrasives, gpl, technical gases; 
insulation for petrochemical plants, refineries, power plants, etc. 
The NCA is regularly renew every third year: the one currently in force for the 
triennium 2015-2018 was signed on 15 October 2015 (previous renewal during the last 
decade: 10 May 2006; 18 December 2009; 22 September 2012). On 8 June 2018, the 
social partners reached an agreement on the platform hypothesis for the NCA renewal for 
the triennium 2019-2021. They agreed upon an overall wage increase amounting to €130. 
Beyond the economic treatment, the agreed platform aims at valorising the company-level 
collective bargaining by widening the issues covered by the decentralized collective 
agreements as well as by increasing the budgetary transfer from the national to the 
decentralised level. In particular the company-level negotiations will have to target the 
improvement of the productivity, the profitability, the welfare policies and the education 
and training programmes. Moreover, the new platform aims at simplifying the regulatory 
aspects of the NCA.  
The decentralised collective bargaining in the pharmaceutical sector occurs 
primarily at company level where the social partners sign integrative collective agreements 
to the national one. The second level collective agreements mainly deal with the following 
matters: performance-related pay, productivity bonuses, integrative welfare, training and 
education. 
A bipartite sector-specific body has been established through an agreement 
between the social partners in the sector (Filctem-Cgil, Femca-Cisl, Uiltec-Uil, Ugl-Chimici, 
Failc-Confail, Fialc-Cisal on the union side; Federchimica, Farmindustria, Assovetro, Anicta 
on the employer side) regarding the pension fund. It is called FONCHIM - the Pension Fund 
for the Chemical-Pharmaceutical sector. 
 
3.1.3. Network Analysis of CB in the pharmaceutical sector 
 
The industrial relations in the sector: characteristics and coordination 
According to a report issued in May 2018 by Federchimica, the system of industrial 
relations in the pharmaceutical sector is described as modern and efficient, built through a 
high degree of involvement and participation of the companies in the relevant decisions 
and thanks to a relationship between the social partners featured by reciprocal 
responsibility and acknowledgment; a longstanding, sound and continuous dialogue 
between the parties; and a pragmatic and not ideological attitude oriented to problem-
solving negotiations (Federchimica 2018). Such a constructive and collaborative 
framework, defined as “an absolutely collaborative relationship, a constant dialogue” 





incremental process rooted on a series of hinges. In particular, the role of the actors and 
the reciprocal posture they adopted turned to have played a crucial role. 
A first pivotal characteristic relates to the size and the composition of the network. 
It is a relatively small network made up of 16 actors belonging to the three main unions 
(Filctem-Cgil, Femca-Cisl, Uiltec-Uil) and the two employers’ associations Federchimica and 
Farmindustria, hence the degree of fragmentation is very low. Furthermore, importantly, it 
embodies a stable network where the actors display not only a longstanding experience in 
their organisation of belonging, but also a sizeable involvement in the wage setting in the 
pharmaceutical sector, as displayed in the following table. Among the Italian respondents 
in both sectors of analysis, the large majority has been directly involved in the wag setting 
within their organization for more than 5 years.  Such stability and continuity in the 
composition of the network has strengthened and facilitated the coordination among the 
actors. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive characteristics of respondents in the pharmaceutical sector 
 Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Total 
Time in current organisation      
Up to 5 years 1 5 9 2 17 
More than 5 years 9 15 33 35 92 
Time in wage-setting in 
sector 
     
Up to 5 years 2 3 26 11 42 
More than 5 years 8 17 16 26 67 
Type      
Direct involvement 8 20 42 36 106 
Indirect involvement 2 0 0 1 3 
Involvement in wage setting 
in other sectors 
     
No 4 5 21 14 44 
Yes 6 15 20 22 63 
Total 10 22 42 38 112 
 
 
As emerged from the SNA, in fact, the lack of trust among the actors, the power 
differences among the actors and the fragmentation in the representation of workers or 
firms do not represent, according to the survey, a challenge for the coordination in the wage 
setting in the sector. 
 
Table 2: Main challenges for coordinating (1 = irrelevant | 5 = extremely relevant). 
Lack of trust 2,38 
Power differences 2,63 
Fragmentation in the representation of workers or firms 3,13 
Obstacles from economic and/or sectorial context 3,63 
 
 
Relatedly, the continuous periodical interactions and meeting the social partners 
hold have reinforced the trust among the actors and their capacity to coordinate. The key 





dialogue constant over time, well beyond the formal institutional appointments for the 
negotiations of the national collective agreements:  
 
once the renewal is completed, the dialogue continues. It is a feature of our 
industry. Why? Because there is a series of commitments that we set among 
each other, especially in the contract renewal phase, which became an 
opportunity for debating, and in some cases for working together. So, these 
moments, representing occasions where we exchange opinions, we discuss 
specific in-depth aspects on some issues, are constant. It is clear, then, that 
these moments the closer we get to a contract renewal deadline, the more 
they become meaningful, they become more frequent and they are an 
element that practically allow, even before starting to sit at the table of a 
contract renewal, they now allow to facilitate the dialogue (Interview to 
FILCTEM – CGIL). 
 
Beyond the formal meeting purposely devoted to the discussion and the definition 
of the contractual platform, leading then to the signature of the national collective 
agreements every third year, the social partners in the pharmaceutical sector exploit several 
other formal and informal occasion to interact, including the training meetings for the union 
workplace representatives, the meetings relating to the management of the bipartite 
sector-specific body FONCHIM for the integrative pension fund, the training meetings 
focused on health and safety issues at workplace, and the National Observatory. 
The centrality of the informal relationships emerging from the qualitative interviews 
is confirmed also by the SNA: as displayed in the table the predominant form of interaction 
occurring among the actors are the informal bilateral meetings (3,33), followed by the 
informal multilateral meetings (3,08). 
 









3,33 2,38 3,08 2,85 
 
 
In terms of network centralization in the pharmaceutical sector, the power is highly 
concentrated in a small number of actors who are key in the bargaining process. Such 
characteristic emerges clearly from the qualitative interview, during which the five core 
actors, one from each organization, are pointed out: they remain stable along time, renewal 
after renewal, they regularly meet formally and above all informally, they all have a 
technical role in their organization and they practically carry out the negotiation for the 
definition of the NCA. Conversely, the results of the SNA show the opposite picture: the index 
relating to the degree of centralization attains the minimum value of 0, meaning that all 
actors have degree of power in the network. 
 
Table 4: Degree of centralization in Italian pharmaceutical sector 











Keeping into consideration the methodological limitation of the SNA, it is plausible 
that the qualitative interviews provide more reliable data on this point.  
A further key characteristic concerns the unitary positions of the social partners in 
the sector, and in particular of the trade unions. Accordingly, the degree of inter-
coordination, and above all, of intra-coordination among organisations is particularly high. 
 
Another thing that has helped us a lot is that, in our sector, thanks to the 
fact that we have worked in this direction, the union has always been fairly 
unified, there have never been any major cracks in our sector. There were 
moments, perhaps due to other events, of tensions, but we put the positions 
back together, we collaborated to reconstruct the relationship, and this was 
certainly an advantage (Interview to Federchimica). 
 
The ideational divides that have repeatedly featured the relationship at the national 
level between the three major union confederation CGIL, CISL, and UIL in diverse historical 
moments do not reflect the unitary stance traditionally adopted by the three sectoral trade 
unions affiliated (FILCTEM – CGIL, FEMCA – CISL, and, UILTEC – UIL). This is relevant from 
different perspectives: it legitimizes the role of the trade unions by strengthening their 
position with the counterpart, which, on its side, is strong and unitary. 
 
As far as the trade unions are concerned, we have never made separate 
contracts, unlike in other sectors. There have been moments of trouble, but 
in the fact we fixed them quickly, because, our organisations operate in the 
context of good unitary relations, it is clear that in certain situations, where 
great difficulties emerged within the union confederations, this has some 
influences for us, we cannot deny it. But fortunately, the trouble has not been 
so harsh, and perhaps the unitary tradition that was built in the past in this 
category turned to have been stronger, which has made it possible to 
overcome even this type of difficulty (Interview to FILCTEM- CGIL). 
 
To this aim, the employers’ association Federchimica, thanks to its strong 
organizational structure, the high coverage in the sector and the responsibility it has 
historically had as pivotal actor and collector of interests to coordinate the actions between 
the social partners. Overall the sectoral dynamics and developments have prevailed over 
the confederal national union trajectories, reflecting a high degree of intra-unions 
coordination: 
 
there have been moments, in these 40 years, of greater difficulty, of some 
difficulty because perhaps confederal events outside the sector, especially 
in the union, could affect certain things, but the culture of industrial and 
sectoral relations has always prevailed in the end; has overcome them 
(Interview to Federchimica) 
 
Also, in this case, the picture displayed by the SNA does not reflect the reality, 
because of the methodological limitations pointed out in the methodological section. The 
average tie strength measure (ranging from 0 to 8) is rather low in the pharmaceutical 






Table 5: Tie strength in the Italian Pharmaceuticals 
















Italy Pharma 3,4 - 4, 2,5 
      
 
 
The unitary position of the social partners is also connected to the share “spirit of 
service” (Interview to Federchimica), as opposed to an ideological approach driving the 
industrial relations and negotiations in the pharmaceutical sector. This aspect reflects on 
the one hand the willingness of the parties involved to overcome ideological-based division 
and clashes, to find instead a common platform, and on the other, importantly it conveys 
their shared belief that  industrial relations serve as main platform to introduce innovation 
in the industry (Interview to FILCTEM – CGIL): 
 
we do innovative things, trying to give a role to the industrial relations. We 
have shared for several years the idea that industrial relations are a lever 
for development, one of the levers for development. Our relationships are 
an element of competitiveness for us; they make the systems stable, 
adaptable, flexible; hence meeting the needs of the two parties. And so, we 
worked a lot in the past on this kind of industrial relations. Was it an element 
of peculiarity? Yes, I would say. (Interview to FEMCA – CISL). 
 
If innovation represents an essential element in the negotiation, the contractual 
platform hinges on a range of work-related dimensions, and of particular importance are 
“all the aspects relating to safety, health and environment at work” (Interview to FILCTEM – 
CGIL). Negotiation over wages is still present and relevant, based on the willingness of both 
the parties to overcome the pure logic of adaptation of wage dynamics to the inflation, but 
the social partners in the sector opted for better qualifying their contractual platforms:  
 
Salary levels remain in our sector an important dimension of confrontation, 
hence we avoid the automatism inflation/increases: inflation rate is still the 
reference, then we wanted to keep negotiation alive on that issue, with 
interesting results. But we tried to better qualify our industrial relations. For 
instance, we tried to move forward and innovate on the issue of 
participation. […] Hence, we focus on relationship, training, safety, we try to 
provide a better welfare starting from the pension funds and the healthcare 
integrative scheme (Interview to FEMCA – CISL). 
 
All in all, as recognized also by the parties involved, such a pragmatic “spirit of 
service” was also adopted to respond to the peculiar productive environment characterizing 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, which distinguish it from the traditional Fordist 





and of employers prevail, in the former the context where negotiation is embedded is 
different:  
 
We are talking about very different worlds. It is clear that the chemical 
sector, inherently, pushes towards a different approach in the industrial 
relations since we are dealing with process-based companies. In process-
based companies you cannot switch off the machines and say “see you next 
Monday”, these enterprises work in a different way (FILCTEM – CGIL). 
  
A final characteristic of the industrial relations in the pharmaceutical sector 
emerging from the qualitative interviews concerns the role they had in the crisis. Overall the 
financial crisis was handled as an opportunity rather than a threat as in other manufacturing 
industries: it represented in fact an opportunity to further strengthen the national collective 
agreement and the role of the social partners in times of retrenchment and financial 
restraints, that often embodied an open threat to the institutions of social dialogue and an 
occasion for employers to weaken the role of the organized labour. 
 
In such a context, what was the relevance of the industrial relations? In my 
perspective, they have influenced two main fundamental aspects. First, the 
stable industrial relations in this sector enabled to govern and control 
difficult conditions, through a series of specific tools to cope with an 
exceptional situation that limited the negative repercussions on workers. 
Second, the framework of the industrial relations has allowed the national 
collective agreement to contribute to solve the critical situation. We kept on 
renewing the contract even in the harshest moments of the crisis exactly 
because it held a function of responsibility toward the enterprises, towards 
the workforce. And it had to safeguard them above all in the moment of 
difficulty (Femca – Cisl). 
 
As reported by Federhcimica “it is when the crisis hits that we need even better industrial 
relations” (Interview to Federchimica). 
 
3.2. Retail sector  
 
3.2.1. Socio-economic situation of the sector 
 
Retailers (supermarkets, fast-food outlets, and other large-scale food retailers) are among 
the most powerful actors of the consumer driven chain. Retail is an extremely important, 
heterogeneous and labour-intensive sector, employing some 9% of the EU’s workforce. 
Around 60% of retail workers are women, and a high amount of young and poorly-qualified 
workers is employed. Pay is relatively low and there are high proportions of part-time work 
and weekend working. Traditionally, retail has been a sector with low wages and with a pay 
gap between women and men (EurWork, 2004). 
The industry is experiencing structural changes, with processes of concentration and 
diversification, and pressures for the restructuring, deregulation and reduction of 
employment. Many analysts in the last years coined the concept of “retail apocalypse”, 





chains drastically reduce their points of sale due to the spread of online sales and to the 
narrowing of profit margins determined by a systematic discount policy implemented to 
withstand competition.  
The retail sector presents sharp differences between retailers, depending mostly on 
the competitive strategies of firms and the sub-sector within which they operate. The retail 
trade in general is dominated by small firms, but the trend in the last decades has changed, 
involving the large companies. In Italy, large-scale and associated retailing covers 75% of 
market, while “traditional” retailing accounts for only 25%. The entrance of large 
multinational retailers since the mid-1990s has deeply changed the structure and 
functioning of the sector. 
The retail sector in Italy has been seriously affected by the economic crisis. The 
mass retailing sub-sector is partially managing to limit losses by keeping prices down. 
Medium, small and micro enterprises have been the hardest hit, with many closing down in 
2009. According to a report of Eurofound, over the past 25 years the retail sector in Italy 
has undergone widespread restructuring: large distribution chains achieve a dominant 
position in the sector by making extensive use of non-standard labour contracts, especially 
part-time. The social partners have put in place a network of bipartite bodies in order to 
manage training, health and safety at work, by including SMEs (Eurwork, 2012). 
The enterprises operating in the retail sector have various characteristics. In mass 
retailing there are many large national and international groups, while in more traditional 
commercial activities or in the repair of goods, motorcycles or vehicles, small and medium-
sized enterprises are more frequent. The considerable reduction in consumption (one of the 
principal effects of the financial crisis) has particularly affected the small, medium and 
micro enterprises of the sector, while the mass retail sub-sector, as it was able reduce 
prices, managed to actually increase profits by 1.2% in 2009 (Unioncamere). 
According to the census of ISTAT (2001), over 1, 6 million were working in the retail 
sector, 57.3% of them as self-employed - both entrepreneurs and collaborators. 51.3% of 
employed were women: while they largely dominated amongst employees (60.9%), men 
prevailed amongst self-employed. While over 95% of self-employed were concentrated in 
companies with less than ten employees, these latter showed a U-distribution by company 
size: almost 35% of them worked in micro companies with less than 10 employed and 29% 
in large firms with more than 250 employed. The share of women over the total workforce 
was above 60% in both micro and large firms and attained its minimum (57.7%) in firms 
having 10-19 employed (EurWork, 2012). It is worth to note that small and micro retail 
employers increase their average size while medium and large ones display a decline in 
their average employees, due to both the new entries and outsourcing processes (INPS, 
2011). Employees in the retail sector increase by 16.2% from 2005 to 2009. Clerks account 
for about 53% of the workforce, with a slight decline over time. Blue collars (+23.7) and 
cadres and managers (+21.1%) increase more than average, apparently parallel with the 
increasing role of multinational firms (mainly retail chains), while the decline in apprentices 
(most of them blue collars) is due to the impact of 2009 recession. The share of women 
increased from 60.7% in 2005 to 62.1% in 2008 over the total workforce, then declines in 
2009 to 61.9%. The profiles are clearly female dominated (over 68%). Blue collars show an 
almost even distribution amongst gender, with a noticeable increase of women from 49.6% 
to 52.9%, while managers are clearly male dominated, although the share of women is 
increasing (EurWork, 2012). 
The Organized Distribution operators (DO – Distribuzione Organizzata) include: Coop 





and Coralis. The chains belonging to a single company or corporate group of companies 
(the so-called branch companies) are instead defined as Large Distribution (GD). This group 
includes: Esselunga, Auchan, Carrefour, Finiper, Gruppo Pam, Bennet, Lidl Italia and 
Eurospin. 
Retail in Italy is highly diversified and presents differences between regions, in 
particular between the north and south. In the North, the higher income levels consequently 
produce higher retail concentration. In the Italian retail market, consumers demand 
increasingly for services rather than for products. On the other hands, the competition 
among groups is re-shaping, with widespread recourse to buying groups by multinational 
firms. The differentiated structure of competition makes it less effective to apply 
standardized business logic. In general, the complexity of the Italian market leads to strong 
differentiation of retailer’s commercial performance. The presence of cooperative groups 
on the Italian market has also reduced growth opportunities for international distributors.  
Among the international groups which have developed a significant presence to date, we 
mention the two French firms Carrefour and Auchan. Among the cooperatives, Coop and 
Conad are very strong players. In order to strengthen their competitiveness against modern, 
mostly foreign-owned companies, a number of locals have looked for foreign partners with 
whom they can combine their activities. Partnerships include matches such as 
Leclerc/Conad and Carrefour/Gruppo GS.  
The six main players in Fast-Moving Consumer Goods retailing in Italy are:  
 Auchan, French retailer 
 Carrefour, French retailer  
 Conad, Italian cooperative set up in Bologna in 1962 
 Coop, Italian cooperative, market leader in Italian MGD (Modern Grocery 
Distribution) 
 Esselunga, founded in 1957, private Italian company  
 Selex, one of the biggest associations of independent retailers in Italy. 
 
3.2.2. Single and multi-employer collective bargaining 
 
In Italy, since December 2018, three sectoral collective agreements at national level 
regulated basic and general terms of pay and employment conditions in the retail sector - 
for medium and large-scale retailers, for small retailers and for cooperative retail 
respectively. Company-level bargaining, within the sectoral frameworks, deals with 
complementary and more specific issues, mainly in large stores. Only recently, 
Federdistribuzione, who separated from Confcommercio in 2011, signed the fourth 
collective agreement who sets the pay and the employment conditions for the GDO 
(December, 2018). Therefore, from January 2019, four collective agreements at national 
level regulate the employment conditions and wage settings in the retail sector. On the 
employer side, there are various associations representing the enterprises operating in the 
retail sector: Confcommercio, Confesercenti, Federdistribuzione, ANCC, ANCD. 
Confcommercio (Confederazione generale del commercio, del turismo, dei servizi 
delle professioni e delle PMI) is the General Confederation for Trade, Tourism, Services and 
SMEs. With its 700,000 affiliated companies and almost 2,700,000 employees, it 
represents the largest employer association in Italy. It affiliates medium and large-scale 
retailers.  
Federdistribuzione is the lead trade association for the large & modern retail 





retail companies operating in the food & non-food: hypermarkets, supermarkets, 
superettes, discounts, department stores, large specialized stores. Federdistribuzione 
belonged to Confcommercio since 2011 and grouped mostly the large retailers, historically 
not involved in the associative life. From 2008 to 2011 the representatives of 
Federdistribuzione were responsible in the negotiations for the renewals of the collective 
agreement of Confcommercio (most of them were members of the negotiating 
commission). In December 2011, Federdistribuzione became an autonomous association, 
being dissociated from Confcommercio. The reasons behind the separation rely mainly on 
the different – and sometimes conflicting – interests between small and large retailers. As 
already mentioned, the release of Federdistribuzione from Confcommercio altered the 
historical equilibriums of the industrial relations in the sector. In December 2018, the 
association Federdistribuzione signed a new national collective agreement for Modern 
Retail with the three main trade unions, reflecting the specificities of the industry.  
Confesercenti, is the General Confederation for Shopkeepers (Confederazione degli 
Esercenti) representing small retailers. 
The National Association of Consumer Cooperative ANCC (Associazione Nazionale 
Cooperative di Consumatori) is the employer association that affiliates the cooperative 
enterprises operating in the retail sector on a medium and large-scale. It is affiliated to the 
National League of Cooperative Legacoop (Lega delle cooperative).  
The National Association of Retail Cooperatives ANCD (Associazione Nazionale 
Cooperative fra dettaglianti) is the employer association that affiliates the cooperative 
enterprises operating in the retail sector on a small-scale. It is affiliated to the National 
League of Cooperative Legacoop (Lega delle cooperative).  
On the trade union side, the main organisations representing in the sector are 
Filcams-Cgil, Fisascat-Cisl and Uiltucs-Uil. They all negotiate the four national collective 
agreements. 
From 2019, there are four different national collective agreements applied in the 
retail sector, negotiated by the three major unions in the sector with diverse employer 
associations representing medium and large-scale retailers, small retailers, and the 
cooperative retail.  
1) The NCA of commerce for employees working in companies operating in the 
tertiary sector, in the services and retail, signed by the employer association 
Confcommercio and the three main unions Filcams-Cgil, Fisascat-Cisl and Uiltucs-
Uil. The last renewal was signed on 31 March 2015, covering the triennium 2015-
2018 and it has been extended to 31st December 2019 (it expired on 31st July 
2018). The contract provided for an average increase of wage levels of €85, it 
introduced significant changes relating to the use of the fixed-term employment 
contracts and a simplification of the regulatory regime of working time to increase 
flexibility. The sphere of application is large and covers a relevant variety of 
professional profiles. About 400000 firms and over 2 million of employees are 
involved. 
2) The NCA for the workers employed in enterprises in the tertiary sector, in the 
distribution and in the service sector (Contratto Collettivo Nazionale di lavoro per i 
dipendenti da aziende del terziario della distribuzione e dei servizi) signed by the 
employer association Confesercenti and by the three main unions in the sector 
Filcams-Cgil, Fisascat-Cisl and Uiltucs-Uil.  
3) The NCA for workers employed in retail and distribution cooperatives (Contratto 





cooperative), signed by the three main unions Filcams-Cgil, Fisascat-Cisl and Uiltucs-
Uil and a series of employer associations for cooperatives (ANCC Coop, ANCD 
Conad, CCI, AGCI). The last renewal was signed in 2008. 
4) The NCA for the workers employed in the Large Retail (Contratto Collettivo 
Nazionale di Lavoro della Distribuzione Moderna Organizzata - DMO), signed for the 
first time in December 2018 by the employer association Federdistribuzione and by 
the three main unions in the sector Filcams-Cgil, Fisascat-Cisl and Uiltucs-Uil.  
 
3.2.3. Network Analysis of CB in Large Retail: Survey Results 
 
The industrial relations in the sector: characteristics and coordination 
The industrial relations in the retail sector reflect to a large extent the overall national 
patterns. There is quite a close relationship between the rates of union density in general 
and those of the retail sector. Countries with a high union density in the overall economy 
also have a high density in the retail sector, and vice versa. Retail is however a sector with 
a relatively low union presence. Union density in retail is considerably lower than that in the 
general economy. Moreover, in the majority of countries trade union presence is very low, 
or almost non-existent, in small independent outlets (Eurofound, 2004). 
The pattern of employers’ organisation in the retail sector is also complex and 
partially related to the general patterns of employers’ organisation in each country. In Italy, 
the employers’ representation in retail is divided and fragmented. In many cases, the line 
of division essentially follows the criteria of the size (or type) of business, or the difference 
between the for-profit private sector and cooperatives. The employers’ organisations 
perform collective bargaining functions and play a key role in the system of industrial 
relations in retail.  
In general terms, the industrial relations in the retail sector in Italy are characterized 
by a strong contractual fragmentation and a relative contractual dumping. The relationships 
among social partners during the last contractual rounds have been conflictual, and most 
of the issues during the negotiations have been solved informally. It should be noticed that 
the retail sector in Italy is characterized by the spread of the so-called “pirate contracts”. 
With respect to this strong fragmentation, the inter-confederal agreement signed by 
Confcommercio and the main trade unions opened, for the first time in the Italian 
panorama of industrial relations, the possibility of measuring the representativeness of the 
employers organizations as well, with the aim of identifying the “most representative” 
organizations capable to sign agreements that can be more easily recognized, in court, as 
effective towards the whole sector.  
For the purpose of this study, the main national collective agreement – in terms of 
employers and employees involved – signed by Confcommercio and the three main trade 
unions has been considered during the network analysis of the collective bargaining in the 
retail sector. However, all the actors involved in the other national collective agreements 
have been both interviewed in the explorative stage and involved in the survey, given the 
tight interdependencies among organizations and the last contractual rounds, 
characterized, as already mentioned, by the release of Federdistribuzione from 
Confcommercio and the recent signature of the fourth national collective agreement of the 
DMO (Organized Modern Distribution). Moreover, it should be noticed that, in the case of the 
retail sector, more or less the same actors negotiate in different bargaining processes. The 
main trade unions, for instance, negotiate the four national collective agreements. 





with the other organizations (in particular with Confesercenti and Uiltucs-Uil) during the last 
bargaining process for the recent signature of the collective agreement of the Large Retail. 
The relationships among social partners during the last contractual rounds, therefore, have 
been considered in the analysis of the network in the collective bargaining in retail, beyond 
the fragmentation of the network and the variety of bargaining processes.    
Concerning the size and the composition of the network, given the high degree of 
fragmentation abovementioned, about 20 actors are involved in the core bargaining 
processes. They belong to the three main trade unions (Filcams-Cgil, Fisascat-Cisl, Uiltucs-
Uil), and the 5 employers’ associations (Confcommercio, Confesercenti, Federdistribuzione, 
ANCC and ANCD). Both in the qualitative interviews and in the survey questions, 15 actors 
with a political and/or technical role have been selected. 12 actors responded to the survey 
(3 women and 9 men), with a response rate of the 80%. As already mentioned, the large 
majority of the network members have a longstanding experience in their organization, 
being involved in the wage setting for more than 5 years. The lack of trust among the actors 
and the power differences among the actors do not represent, according to the survey, a 
challenge for the coordination in the wage setting in the sector. However, the fragmentation 
in the representation of workers and firms, and the obstacles from economic and/or 
sectorial context are challenging the coordination in the retail sector, which has been 
seriously affected by the economic crisis. The considerable reduction in consumption, in 
fact, has particularly affected the small, medium and micro enterprises in the last years. 
 
Table 6: Main challenges for coordinating (1 = irrelevant | 5 = extremely relevant). 
Lack of trust 2,58 
Power differences 2,83 
Fragmentation in the representation of workers or firms 4,00 
Obstacles from economic and/or sectorial context 4,17 
 
 
The continuous periodical interactions and meeting reflect the alteration of the 
historical balances after the opening of another negotiating table with the large scale-retail 
(as underlined during the qualitative interviews). The creation of a fourth pole of 
representation of the associations operating within the Italian market led to a problem for 
the contract renewals that the social partners faced with a constant dialogue and informal 
interactions over time (both bilateral and multilateral). Their capacity to coordinate, in fact, 
has been severely tested by the split of the employer front and the signature of a fourth 
NCA, perceived and defined as a trauma. For this reason, mainly, the key interviewees have 
described the relationships among social partners as both conflictual and collaborative, 
built mainly through informal interactions.  
 
…if I said collaborative, I would say something that does not photograph the 
deep tensions that have been reached, but also in the context of deep 
tensions the outcome has always been to overcome these strong moments 
(Confcommercio) 
 






…It is the word ‘coordination’ that puzzles me. Rather, there are rules 
defined in the interconfederal agreements, which give the bargaining 
guidelines (ANCD) 
 
Another aspect underlined by the key respondents is the relevance of high intra 
organisational coordination. First of all, the trade unions, in front of the high fragmentation 
in the industrial relations system, tried to overcome the distances by keeping the bargaining 
process somehow unitary, since they negotiate in the meantime (but not simultaneously) 
on various negotiating tables. Their strategy has been mainly to present unitary platforms 
during the bargaining process, with the effort of overcoming the different positions.  
Then the employers’ associations present a high intra organizational coordination 
as well, with the willingness of finding a synthesis in the conflicting interests among the 
associated firms. Confcommercio, for example, is characterized by an “internal union 
commission” which is activated when the negotiations begin. It is an internal coordination 
structure that has the task of summarizing the various and specific sectorial needs, as 
underlined during the interview. Since the members of this confederation are variegated, 
the coordination within the association itself is an important aspect in the bargaining 
process. 
Federdistribuzione has an internal committee named “Comitato Lavoro” (Labour 
Committee), formed by the HR directors of the associated firms that express their requests. 
Then a committee is made by 12 firms of larger dimensions, where the decisions are 
discussed internally and taken in the bargaining process. The SNA explores intra and inter 
actor (union and employer) coordination through the average tie strength between sides 
and within them (ranging from 0 to 8). This corresponds to a value of 6 for the average tie 
strength within unions, 2,73 within the employers’ associations and 3,83 between 
employers’ associations and unions. Again, keeping into account the methodological 
limitation of the SNA, it is plausible that the qualitative interviews provide more reliable 
data on this point. 
 
Table 7: Tie strength in the Italian Retail Sector 











Average tie strenght 
(between 
employers&unions) 
Italy Retail 3,97 2,73 6, 3,83 
      
 
 
The presence of patters settlers for wage setting (sectors or firms) is relevant in the 
retail sector, as the table below shows. 
 
Table 8: Pattern settlers for wage setting in the retail sector (sector or companies included) 
 Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Total 
Yes 1 8 11 0 20 







As emerged from the SNA, in the Italian case informality is the predominant form 
of interaction. This is even more the case of the retail sector, as already mentioned, where 
the fragmented network is characterized by informal interactions among social partners. 
Along this line, the SNA shows that people attending more events are not necessarily those 
with higher influence in wage setting. In facts, the Pearson’s correlation between the % of 
events attended and the perceived influence is negative in Italy.  
 
Table 9: Pearson’s correlation between percentage of events attended and perceived 
influence in the Retail sector 
Country Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Total 
 0.365 -0.229 0.246 0.400* 0.145 
 
 
During the qualitative interviews, the social partners in the retail sector underlined 
that the recent changes have led to a reconfiguration of the power distribution in the 
network itself. In particular, a relevant power of relatively weak organizations during the 
release of Federdistribuzione has been noticed. The Union Uiltucs-Uil, in fact, has been used 
as the “harmed branch” of Confcommercio against Federdistribuzione, whereas 
Confesercenti had a key role of broker during the last bargaining processes. These dynamics 
should be taken into account when analysing the network centralization. As the results of 
the SNA show, the index relating to the degree of centralization (0,333) suggests that all 
actors have degree of power in the network. However, the reconfiguration of power 
distribution in the network emphasized during the qualitative interviews is not detected. On 
the other hands, the variance of the weighted degrees indicates higher differences in 
degrees and, thus, an unequal distribution of centrality. This measure, corresponding to a 
value of 1,231 in the retail sector, offers a more precise indicator of centralization within 
the weighted network. 
 
Table 10: Degree of centralization in Italian Retail Sector 




Italy Retail 1,231 1,231 
 
 
Nevertheless, the structure in the figure below shows that the trade unions appear 
still central in the bargaining network.  
 
 




Node size: perceived influence 








Figure 1: Italian Retail Sector Contact Network 
 
 
Column A:  
all frequencies of contact are included 
 
Column B: links ≤5 have been removed for 
better visual interpretation (scale from 





Based on question “Please indicate from 1 (never) to 5 (very frequently) the 
frequency you have met with each of these individuals, either physically, by phone or video-
conference, during the last wage-setting process. Both formal and informal relations are 
considered”, this network shows only those actors who have responded the survey and have 
been included in the questionnaire questions (these are the usual criteria for including 
actors in network analysis). One limitation of this view is that who seems to be the second 
more central actor (in line with the perceived influence that all respondents attribute to 
them) is removed from the graph, because he or she does not respond the survey. However, 
his or her position is estimated taking into account other’s responses (based on the 
responses of the other actors in the network). Therefore, an important position is missing. 
On the other side, this is not a severe issue, since the overall structure of the network does 
not change so much when removing this central actor. 
 
 
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In line with the objectives of the country reports, this section will serve two main goals: 
A. First, to start building a narrative around the findings that will help to start writing a 
potential paper 
B. Second, to reflect on the importance of the methodology used, the innovative 
insights it provides in relation to previous work and future avenues of research coming out 
from the analysis. 
 
On the methodological issue, the reports on the two sectors show some limits of the 
SNA applied to this type of study. In fact, it has been difficult to rebuild the entire network 





relationships when the actors of the network are so few and easily identifiable. But 
combining SNA with qualitative interviews can be an approach that has elements of 
strength: in-depth qualitative interviews offer a lot of information on trust and power 
relationships between various actors, thus helping to fill the gap of SNA analysis. Likewise, 
the combination of SNA analysis and interviews helps to better understand the contents of 
the exchanges between the actors, that do not emerge clearly from SNA. Finally, it is worth 
noting that when there is a dissonance between the SNA results and the qualitative 
interviews, we tend to attribute greater reliability to the results that emerge from the 
interviews, confirming the importance of combining the two methods for the study of wage 
coordination. 
As for the contents of the research, it showed the need to root social network 
analysis in the institutional context. A clear example is given by the role that in the past 
state-owned firms played the pharmaceutical sector: they promoted cooperative 
relationships between firms, unions and employers’ associations which have then 
reproduced over time. Another example is given by the importance of economic dynamism 
of each sector: retail and pharma differ radically in terms of competitive strategies (based 
on innovation in the pharma sector and on costs competition for retail) and this has a 
notable effect on the structure and dynamics of collective bargaining.  
As for the coordination process, the role of the individual actors counts: the identity 
of the unions and employers fonctionnaires participating in the bargaining round is 
extremely important to explain coordination. In both sectors, the same individual actors 
have a long experience of participation in collective bargaining and this helped to ensure 
that trust relationships emerge between the actors, favouring a positive outcome of the 
coordination process. Individual trust and relationships based on frequent formal and 
informal meeting favoured a pragmatic and cooperative behaviour of actors.  
Many meetings among relevant actors occur over time, even beyond the bargaining 
round, favouring the emerging of a nexus of exchanges. At the same time, these actors are 
involved in different processes of negotiation well beyond wages: in other words, wage 
setting is part of a broader bargaining process in which other topics are also negotiated. 
This is important for the relational approach we use because it implies a) the rise of 
exchange processes between actors on different issues (training, rights, welfare provisions, 
etc.) that favour coordination on wages b) the creation of mutual obligations (social capital 
à la Coleman) that can encourage cooperative behaviour. 
By this point of view, the role of informal relationships is very important in both 
sectors. Although the two sectors have a different organizational landscape (with high 
fragmentation in commerce and low fragmentation in pharmaceuticals), informal links 
matter.  
Focusing on the strengths/weaknesses of the networks in the two sectors, we tried 
to test if coordination emerged more easily where there were strong and stable 
relationships between actors, with low fragmentation, as in the case of the pharmaceutical 
industry or not. The results show a partially different picture: on the one hand, the type of 
inter-organizational relationships of the pharmaceutical sector favour the coordination on 
wages, but on the other in a more fragmented system such as retail, alternative path to 
coordination can be found (such as pattern making mechanisms, the presence of dense 
informal relationships that bypass inter-organizational conflicts, strong intra-organizational 
coordination, the role of some broker, etc.) 
On the pharma sector, the importance of stable links and the low fragmentation of 





related to the literature on social capital and to the role of “closed and well-defined networks 
with clearly defined borders” in the creation of trust. For this reason, in this sector the lack 
of trust among the actors, the power differences among the actors and the fragmentation 
in the representation of workers or firms do not challenge wage. At the same time, the 
importance of sharing the same world view between unions and employers’ associations 
contributes to create a common approach to bargaining, strongly based on cooperative 
relationship and to what can be defined as goal-oriented pragmatism that favour 
coordination on wages. 
On the contrary, in the retail sector, the high fragmentation together with the 
difficulties of the context are perceived as problematic, but at the same time they do not 
prevent wage coordination also thanks to some above-mentioned “functional substitutes”. 
In particular, the presence of institutional solutions that increase intra-organizational 
density and stability is interesting for its capability to promote coordination. At the same 
time, even if there is a contractual fragmentation – with several national contracts covering 
this sector - the fact that all of them are signed by the same workers' unions reduce the 
actual inter-organizational fragmentation. Finally, in terms of network structure, it is worth 
noting that the rise of Federdistribuzione seem to have modified power relations in the 
sector, with some actors (such as Confesercenti and UILTUCs) that played a role of 
brokering. 
In conclusion, the combination of SNA with in-depth qualitative interviews helps to 
identify similarities and differences across the two sectors and to have a clearer picture of 
the mechanism behind wage coordination. At the same time, this combination helps to 
better identify key actors and the type of relations among them, that tend to be stable, 
formal and informal and based on personal relationships. As for future research, an 
historical approach that compare different bargaining rounds could help to better 
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